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I. Introduction 
Median net worth of white households is an order of magnitude larger than that of black 
households.1 Large differences in wealth remain even after controlling for confounding factors such as 
earnings or family structure (Choudhury 2001; Barsky et al., 2002; Altonji and Doraszelski, 2005). The 
racial wealth gap has persisted over time, and the Great Recession widened it to the highest level in 30 
years (Pfeffer, 2013; Kocchar and Fry, 2014). Possible explanations for this wealth gap include 
differential saving behavior, asset composition, and bequest motives (Smith, 1995; Menchik and 
Jianakoplos, 1997; Choudhury, 2001; Even and Macpherson, 2003; Gittleman and Wolff, 2004; Kocchar 
and Fry, 2014; Kuan et al., 2015). 
Another possible contributing factor for the black-white wealth gap – one that is ignored in 
existing work – is the consequence of black-white differences in mortality prior to retirement.2 Early 
death reduces household wealth and income, and increases poverty through lost earnings of a 
breadwinner and end-of-life expenses (Attanasio and Hoynes, 2000; McGarry and Schoeni, 2005). Figure 
1 illustrates these stark differences in mortality.3 Approximately 6 percent of all 50-year-olds die before 
age 60. The 10-year mortality rate at age 50 is nearly 70 percent higher for blacks relative to whites.4 
More than 12 percent of black males die within this age span, double the rate in the entire population. 
Similar racial differences emerge at both younger and older ages. 
Large negative earnings shocks such as this can lead households to make financial errors or 
suboptimal choices, which in turn affects subsequent wealth accumulation (Bertrand, Mullainathan and 
Shafir, 2004; Mullainathan and Shafir, 2013). However, the differences in pre-retirement mortality will 
not necessarily influence the wealth gap because households can purchase life insurance to hedge 
                                                          
1 Net worth for the median white household was approximately $190,000 and $19,000 for the median black 
household in 2007 as reported in the SCF (Kochhar and Fry, 2014). 
2 Racial differences in mortality are still present after controlling for education (Waldron, 2002). 
3 Data from the Centers for Disease Control/National Center for Health Statistics Vital Statistics System in 2009. 
4 Ten-year mortality rates are 5.7 percent and 9.5 percent respectively for white and black individuals at age 50. 
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against a breadwinner’s lost earnings from pre-retirement death. Among households with life insurance, 
those experiencing early death would receive a payout, making them far less likely to make costly 
financial choices, such as carrying balances on credit cards, using payday loans, or being unbanked. 
Although a voluntary purchase, life insurance ownership is widespread, with 59 percent of adults having 
an individual policy, group policy, or both in 2010.5 Life insurance coverage is more prevalent where the 
underlying risk from death of a breadwinner carries greater consequences. For example, 71 percent of 
married individuals with a child and mortgage have coverage in comparison to just 27 percent for 
individuals who are single, childless, and rent. All else equal, if black individuals purchase less life 
insurance coverage relative to whites, then the wealth gap would be exacerbated by differential 
mortality risk. Conversely, if black individuals respond to increased mortality risk by holding more life 
insurance then wealth gaps could not be explained by mortality differences. 
The purpose of our study is to explore the existence of racial gaps in life insurance holdings. 
Current evidence on racial disparities in life insurance is sparse. Bernheim et al. (2003) find that blacks 
hold less life insurance relative to whites whereas Gutter and Hatcher (2008) find no disparities in 
overall life insurance ownership. In contrast to both studies, we find that blacks have greater 
participation in life insurance markets, after controlling for other confounding characteristics. Given the 
high levels of life insurance coverage, our basic finding suggests that differential mortality is unlikely to 
contribute to wealth disparities by race. Using multiple years of the Survey of Income and Program 
Participation (SIPP), our preferred specification estimates that blacks are 3 percentage points more likely 
to hold life insurance, from an overall baseline coverage rate of roughly 60 percent. Digging deeper, we 
find that black individuals are much more likely to hold whole life insurance and slightly less likely to 
hold term life coverage. In addition, they have much higher participation in employer-sponsored life 
insurance (ESLI). We show that a key reason our life insurance findings contrast with previous work is 
                                                          
5 Prudential Financial, 2013. 
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that we include single households, while existing studies restrict analysis to married and cohabitating 
households. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II reviews previous studies on life 
insurance, Section III describes the data, Section IV presents the empirical model, Section V discusses 
results, and Section VI concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
Several recent empirical studies have analyzed issues related to the demand for, and adverse 
selection in, life insurance in the United States (Cawley and Philipson 1999; He 2009, 2011; Harris and 
Yelowitz 2014; Hedengren and Stratmann, 2015). Furthermore, mortality risk and demand for life 
insurance has been analyzed at the international level (Li, Moshirian, Nguyen, and Wee 2007; Gatzert 
and Wesker 2014). However, only the work of Bernheim et al. (2003) and Gutter and Hatcher (2008) 
have examined racial disparities in life insurance coverage. 
Gutter and Hatcher (2008) analyze racial differences in life insurance holdings and find no 
evidence of disparities amongst black and white households on the extensive margin (that is, whether 
the household has any life insurance holdings). They do find some racial disparities on the intensive 
margin (that is, comparing the face value of life insurance holdings to possible income losses). Their 
analysis utilized the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF), which has been used in a number of previous 
studies (Lin and Grace, 2007; Liebenberg, Carson, and Dumm, 2012). Notwithstanding the prevalence of 
SCF in life insurance analysis, the sample is limited to observing participation and levels of life insurance 
holdings at the household level. This is problematic because life insurance is priced and purchased at the 
individual-level and not as a household. Thus, it is not possible to conclusively link a life insurance policy 
to the main breadwinner versus a secondary earner. 
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Bernheim et al. (2003) find that uninsured financial vulnerabilities were more common among 
nonwhites, and they were less likely to hedge against the financial consequences of a spouse’s death 
through life insurance. Their study uses the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS), which only includes 
individuals aged 51 to 61 in 1992. Harris and Yelowitz (2014) demonstrate that life insurance demand 
varies by age and the need for life insurance coverage diminishes as an individual approaches 
retirement.  
An important limitation to both studies is that they restrict attention to married or cohabitating 
couples. This type of restriction misses a significant portion of the diversity, as family structure 
drastically differs across race. In 2010, of those that were ever married, 19 percent of whites were 
divorced in comparison to 31 percent of blacks. In addition, blacks were almost twice as likely as whites 
to be single parents (i.e. separated, divorced, widowed, or never married with children).6 Given the 
family structure differences, previous studies limited a disproportionate amount of black individuals that 
would have reason to purchase life insurance. 
 
III. Data 
For our primary analysis, we use data from the 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels of the SIPP to 
examine racial differences in life insurance holdings. This data has been used in recent studies on 
demand for life insurance (Harris and Yelowitz 2014; Hedengren and Stratmann 2015). This nationally 
representative longitudinal sample is constructed through individual interviews in four-month intervals 
known as “waves.” Each wave contains responses regarding income, labor force activity, and 
participation in government assistance programs. In addition to the “core” monthly questions, the 
survey covers less-frequently asked subjects in “topical modules.” The wealth topical modules contain 
information on assets and liabilities (including life insurance holdings) which are asked at least twice per 
                                                          
6 In 2010, 20 and 38 percent of whites and blacks respectively were single parents. 
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panel. The key motivation for using the SIPP data comes from the availability of life insurance questions 
regarding individual market life insurance and ESLI. In addition, the SIPP allows for analysis across a 
broad age cohort with much larger sample sizes than the SCF. 
We restrict our analysis to white and African-American adults aged 18 to 64 who provided 
answers to life insurance questions.7,8 The age restriction is implemented to focus on the group that is 
the most likely to elect life insurance coverage. Additionally, this restriction is meant to include only 
those of working-age population, as the primary role of life insurance is to replace lost earnings of the 
principal breadwinner.  
For comparison purposes, we apply similar screens to data from the SCF for years 2001, 2004, 
2007, 2010 and 2013. The SCF is a triennial survey sponsored by the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System in cooperation with the Statistics of Income Division of the Internal Revenue Service. 
The survey collects detailed information about family finances including incomes, net worth, and credit 
use in addition to basic demographics including marital status and education. It also asks about life 
insurance coverage and holdings at the household level. The SCF is widely used to study issues where 
wealth and financial data are important, and oversamples high-income individuals in order to capture 
the full distribution of wealth (Kennickell, 2008).9 
The two datasets directly overlap for calendar years 2001, 2004, and 2010, which allows for a 
side-by-side comparison. We aggregate the SIPP from the individual level to the household level in Table 
1 to make it comparable to the SCF; in the subsequent regression analysis we utilize the individual-level 
SIPP data to better link life insurance demand to underlying mortality risk. Table 1 shows summary 
statistics for the two datasets in each year. The samples are generally quite similar with respect to family 
                                                          
7 The findings presented hereafter are robust to restricting the sample to individuals aged 25 to 64. 
8 Following Gruber and Yelowitz (1999), we exclude imputed values for life insurance due to criticism of the SIPP 
wealth imputation methodology by researchers (Curtin, Juster, and Morgan 1989; Hoynes, Hurd, and Chand 1998). 
Dropped imputed observations constitute 21 percent of the sample.  
9 Unless noted, we use sample weights for both the SIPP and SCF specifications. 
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structure, racial representation, finances, employment, education and health. Several important 
variables are only available in one of the two datasets; the SIPP includes specific questions about ESLI 
and individual life insurance, while the SCF asks about risk aversion and smoking. 
As can be seen in this table, life insurance ownership is quite common, with roughly 65 percent 
of households having some kind of plan. These levels are very similar to the findings by life insurance 
industry groups (LIMRA, 2013). An important trend, that is prevalent across both data sets, is the decline 
in life insurance over time. There are 10 and 7 percentage point decreases in life insurance coverage 
respectively for the SIPP and SCF samples from 2001 to 2010. Similar declining trends are present for 
term, whole, employer-sponsored and individual life insurance. These declines are consistent with 
industry-level findings that ownership of life insurance is at a 50-year low (Prudential Financial, 2013). 
Households are far more likely to hold term life insurance than whole life insurance, and group coverage 
through an employer is slightly more prevalent than individual life coverage. 
An important advantage of the SIPP is it contains detailed information regarding the source of 
life insurance; it distinguishes different types of life insurance coverage including ESLI and individual 
market purchases. ESLI constitutes a large portion of all life insurance holdings with 36 percent of 
households having ESLI in 2010. In contrast to other types of life insurance, employer coverage is often 
provided automatically for full-time workers. The National Compensation Survey conducted annually by 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, reports that for full-time civilian workers in 2010, 76 percent had access 
to ESLI and 74 percent participated, leading to a take-up rate of 97 percent. In contrast, just 16 percent 
of part-time workers had access to ESLI, although take-up rates were very high for eligible employees as 
well.10 Take-up is extraordinarily high because fewer than 10 percent of workers at firms with basic life 
insurance coverage are required to make a contribution. In the case of death, slightly more than half of 
all workers (54 percent) with ESLI would receive a benefit payment in a fixed multiple of annual earnings 
                                                          
10 All figures on the composition of ESLI come from Tables 17, 18, 20, and 21 of the March 2010 National 
Compensation Survey. 
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for their beneficiaries, while almost all the rest would receive a flat dollar amount (40 percent). Many 
policies provide a flat dollar amount of $50,000 or less because of the tax exemptions.11 The median 
payout for a flat-dollar policy was just $16,000 in 2010 – which might be thought of as covering funeral 
expenses and other short-run costs, and the 90th percentile was $50,000. Of the employer policies that 
provide benefits as a multiple of annual earnings, 58 percent of workers have a plan with 1x earnings, 
and almost all the rest (37 percent) have a plan with 1 to 2x earnings. As a consequence, even though 
ESLI is quite prevalent, it tends to provide small amounts of insurance coverage. 
In addition to mandatory coverage, ESLI policies often allow employees to purchase 
supplemental coverage, although evidence suggests that many employees do not take advantage of 
this.12 These policies are typically community rated meaning they are priced based on the characteristics 
of the group rather than based on a single individual’s probability of death. In contrast, individual life 
insurance policies are experience rated meaning they involve individual underwriting including health 
examinations, blood samples, family history, and assessment of risky behavior in order to determine the 
premium (although such applications do not ask about race). Supplemental ESLI policies are 
advantageous for individuals whose health is poorer than average for the pool of insured employees and 
less advantageous for individuals that are in relatively better health. A major limitation with ESLI is that 
employees generally only qualify for the coverage while they are employed. If the individual loses 
employment (and consequently group coverage) due to health problems, then coverage might be 
prohibitively expensive for the employee in the individual market (Prudential, 2013). In contrast, 
individual term policies are only conditional on premium payments for the life of the policy. 
                                                          
11 The IRS provides an exclusion for the first $50,000 of group-term life insurance coverage provider under a policy 
carried directly or indirectly by an employer.  
12 Using administrative payroll data, Harris and Yelowitz (2015) find that the median employee at a large public 
university in the southeast had life insurance coverage at 1x annual salary; the modal worker did not elect any 
supplemental coverage through the employer. 
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Table 2 shows summary statistics broken out by race for the SIPP. Black individuals have 
substantially less monthly income and lower net worth, consistent with the existing literature on 
wealth/income gaps. In addition, they are less likely to have a college education and report being in 
worse health. African-Americans are less likely to have life insurance, with an ownership gap of 10 
percentage points. The aforementioned decrease in life insurance holdings over time is present for both 
races. After conditioning on employment, participation in ESLI is more similar across races, but blacks 
are still less likely to hold life insurance. 
There are also differences in coverage based on insurance type. The two most common forms of 
life insurance are term and whole.13 Term life insurance covers an individual for a specified period (i.e. a 
10-year term policy) and does not have a “cash value” as payment only occurs in the case of death. 
Whole life insurance policies are guaranteed for the life of the policyholder conditional on premium 
payment and have a “cash value” which can be accessed through termination of the contract. The racial 
disparity exists for term life insurance with mean participation of 36 and 23 percent for whites and 
blacks respectively in 2010. This gap is much smaller for whole life insurance with a 1 percentage point 
difference in whole life insurance coverage. 
Finally, Table 2 illustrates some of the differences in family structure. Whites are more likely to 
marry, less likely to separate, and less likely to divorce conditional on ever being married. Blacks are 
more likely to have a child but less likely to be married and have a child. In 2010, black individuals are 
twice as likely to have never been married and have a child relative to white individuals. These 
differences in family composition could greatly influence both the need and desire for life insurance 
holdings. 
 
 
                                                          
13 Other life insurance policies that also incorporate investment motives include universal life insurance and 
variable life insurance. 
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IV. Demand Determinants and Empirical Model 
One of the major roles of insurance is to smooth family consumption across different states of 
the world. Life insurance can help mitigate the drop in family consumption in the event of death. The 
existence of a dependent family member such as a spouse or child should increase demand for life 
insurance (Inkmann and Michaelides, 2012). One would expect, ceteris paribus, that a single parent 
would have an increased demand for life insurance relative to a married individual because of the lack of 
a provider in the case of early death.14 Therefore, the aforementioned exclusion of single headed 
households by previous work has the potential to affect the analysis. The desire to leave a bequest or 
the emphasis that the individual places on surviving dependents’ well-being also directly influences both 
participation and coverage amounts of life insurance. 
The canonical expected utility model shows that with actuarially fair pricing and risk averse 
individuals everybody should purchase insurance. A majority of the population has some form of life 
insurance coverage, but this is far from the theoretical prediction of full participation. Individuals may 
deviate from the predictions of the rational frictionless environment and fail to purchase life insurance 
due to fixed costs. Fixed costs vary greatly based on the type of insurance. For example, term life 
insurance is associated with extensive underwriting whereas ESLI has much lower fixed costs. These 
fixed costs become less of a concern as the coverage amount increases as well as the term of the policy. 
All else equal, as the fixed costs increase, individuals are less likely to buy life insurance. 
Various psychological frictions or costs exist that cause deviations from the frictionless rational 
model as well. Implicit costs due to the difficulty of evaluating the relative advantages for the various 
types of life insurance can decrease coverage (Iyengar et al., 2004; Handel, 2013). Furthermore, the 
psychological cost of thinking about death decreases the likelihood of purchasing life insurance (Kopczuk 
                                                          
14 Additional earners in the household can be thought of as an imperfect form of self-insurance. The same might be 
true for individuals with larger families or extended networks. See Ehrlich and Becker (1972) and Dehejia et al., 
(2007). 
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and Slemrod, 2005). Price misconceptions can also influence the participation rate. A recent study found 
that 80 percent of Americans misjudged the cost of life insurance (LIMRA, 2015). These misconceptions 
and the cost of correcting these misconceptions decrease life insurance participation. 
 Another consideration for life insurance participation is heterogeneity in health. Life insurance 
companies may reject individuals in poor health to avoid potential losses (Hendren, 2013). This type of 
rejection is again more relevant for individual term policies due to underwriting. In addition, individuals 
in the best health may not purchase insurance because they are pooled together with relatively 
unhealthy individuals and consequently face actuarially unfair premiums (Akerlof, 1970). 
The factors that influence life insurance coverage could vary by race. The following empirical 
model seeks to understand this relationship. Equation (1) presents a linear probability model used to 
test the influence of race on life insurance participation: 
(1) 𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖 
where 𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝐵𝑖 is an indicator variable that the individual was African-American, 𝑋𝑖  represents a vector of 
covariates including age, gender, marital status, children, income, net worth, education, home 
ownership, mortgage, employment, and health following work reviewed in Liebenberg et al. (2012). 
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝑖 is an indicator variable that represents having any, term, whole, ESLI, and individual life 
insurance depending on the specification. The results of the different specifications will give information 
about not only coverage, but also the comprehensiveness of the life insurance policies as measured by 
the form of life insurance and face value. 
 
V. Results 
We first run bivariate regressions to formally measure the relationship between life insurance 
and race.15 Table 3 presents our findings. As expected from the summary statistics given previously, 𝛽1 is 
                                                          
15 Results from a probit regression yield similar results. 
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negative and statistically significant for participation in all of the different types of life insurance. In 
particular, black individuals are approximately 11 percentage points less likely to hold any life insurance 
than white individuals. This negative coefficient is present for all specifications but with varying 
magnitudes. 
In contrast, Table 4 presents the findings of the full model including relevant covariates from the 
SIPP. After controlling for covariates, black individuals are significantly more likely – by 3 percentage 
points – to hold life insurance, which is distinct from previous work that found no racial difference. 
The full model for whole life insurance further finds that blacks are almost 5 percentage points 
more likely to have coverage than whites are. Whole life insurance coverage – which does not have a 
fixed length – is increasing with age. An important difference in the specification with whole life 
insurance is that having a college degree does not increase coverage. 
The racial gap in term life insurance changes from a large negative (12.5 percentage points) to 
small negative effect (1.1 percentage points) after including covariates. This small negative finding could 
partially be due to the inability in the data to completely characterize health, which is explicitly 
incorporated into underwriting in the term life insurance market.  
The probability of having term life insurance is a concave function of age consistent with the 
findings of Jappelli and Pistaferri (2003). The decreasing magnitudes at the latter years of an individual’s 
working years could reflect increasing premium due to actuarial adjustments or potentially decreasing 
need for coverage as children leave home. In contrast to whole life insurance coverage, individuals with 
a college education are almost 10 percentage points more likely to purchase term coverage. 
 In both regressions for term and whole life insurance, we find consistent results for a number of 
covariates. As theory would suggest and consistent with previous findings, the presence of a spouse or 
child increases the likelihood of having life insurance (Jappelli and Pistaferri, 2003; Inkmann and 
Michaelides, 2012). An unmarried partner negatively influences life insurance holdings. Additionally, 
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individuals who are in good health are more likely to have life insurance possibly due to 
screening/underwriting from insurance companies or advantageous selection (Finkelstein and McGarry, 
2006). In addition, homeowners are significantly more likely to have any life insurance and having a 
mortgage increases demand for coverage (Gutter and Hatcher, 2008).16 Employment and income 
additionally both have a positive effect with net worth having a small negative or insignificant effect. 
Males are more likely to have life insurance across all specification (Gandolfi and Miners, 1996). 
In addition to the distinction between whole and term, Table 4 presents the results from ESLI 
and individual life insurance. For both sources of insurance, blacks are more likely to have life insurance. 
The main difference between the two sources of coverage is that being married and having a child does 
not increase coverage in ESLI whereas they are both significant factors for individual market coverage. 
This finding is likely due to automatic coverage given by an employer; virtually all employees take it up 
when offered. 
To gauge the influence of each individual covariate on the transformation of the racial gap from 
negative to positive, we implement a technique prescribed by Gelbach (2015). His work shows that the 
traditional practice of sequentially adding covariates to a model to observe the influence on the 
coefficient of interest leads to ambiguous results that are “sequence-sensitive.” For example, the 
change in the racial gap by adding education as a covariate differs depending on the order it is added to 
the model. If we added education variables first then the observed change in the racial gap would be 
different than if we added family structure first and then added education. This result is due to the 
correlation between education and family structure. In order to create a “path independent” 
explanation of the influence of each covariate Gelbach prescribes omitted variable bias equations to 
gauge the contribution of each covariate. The influence of each covariate is a function of the correlation 
                                                          
16 When a household applies for a mortgage, they may be offered credit insurance, which protects the loan on the 
chance that the applicant cannot make payments. Such insurance is usually optional. Credit life insurance pays off 
all or some of the loan if the applicant dies. See https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0110-credit-insurance. 
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between the covariate and Black in addition to the covariate’s coefficient in the full specification. For 
example, net worth is highly correlated with race but it is not a major determining factor in life 
insurance coverage and therefore does not exhibit a large influence in the transformation of the black 
coefficient from negative to positive.  
Table 5 shows the Gelbach Decomposition for the SIPP analysis covariates following the format 
presented in Grove, Hussey, and Jetter (2011). In the specification for having any life insurance, two 
variables that contribute greatly to the sign change in the racial gap are home ownership and having a 
mortgage. Combined they account for 35 percent of the coefficient’s change. Risk of foreclosure, for 
surviving household members, in conjunction with the negative correlation between homeownership 
and being black causes the inclusion of homeownership/mortgage to greatly influence the black 
coefficient. The influence of being married explains 15 percent, level of education explains 14 percent, 
income explains 13 percent, and employment explains 13 percent of the change in the black coefficient 
from negative 11 percentage points to positive 3 percentage points. The decomposition for term and 
whole life insurance indicates that the same variables tend to explain the majority of the difference. For 
the decomposition for term, education explains relatively more (17 percent) and for whole life insurance 
owning a home accounts for an even greater portion (33 percent). For ESLI, employment and proxies for 
type of employment (personal income and education) account for 68 percent of the change in the 
negative 6 percentage point bivariate result to the positive 3 percentage point racial gap for ESLI.17 
In order to better understand possible racial disparities, we also present results on the intensive 
margin – the face value, in dollars, of such life insurance policies. Caution is needed when examining the 
intensive margin. Clearly, the “face value” of a policy —payout in the case of death— matters for 
hedging against earnings losses, and industry studies suggest coverage levels have fallen (LIMRA, 2013). 
Unfortunately, there is widespread confusion among survey respondents with respect to life insurance 
                                                          
17 The decomposition for the individual market is similar to the decomposition for the any life insurance 
specification. 
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quantities. Two-thirds of respondents in the SIPP misinterpret questions due to confusion between 
“cash value” (which only applies to whole-life policies) and “face value” (which applies to both whole 
and term policies) (Gottschalck and Moore, 2007). These same issues arise to various degrees in other 
datasets, too.18  
Table 6 shows the results from the intensive margin with the face value of life insurance as the 
dependent variable. We only observe the face value in 2001 for the SIPP due to a change in survey 
questions in later years. We perform the analysis using OLS and find that after controlling for covariates 
there is no statistically significant difference between races. Due to the inclusion of many zero values, 
we further test the analysis using a Tobit. After controlling for covariates, we find that the coefficient for 
black is not significantly different from zero consistent with the OLS finding. 
 
VI. Reconciling Results 
Our findings that black individuals are more likely to purchase life insurance diverge from the 
findings of Gutter and Hatcher (2008) and Bernheim et al. (2003). Gutter and Hatcher find no racial 
difference on the extensive margin and that blacks hold less coverage on the intensive margin. 
Bernheim et al. find that nonwhites are more likely to have uninsured vulnerabilities. 
In order to reconcile our results with previous work, we restrict our SIPP sample to 
married/cohabitating individuals in the first panel of Table 7, while including all covariates from Table 4. 
The first row illustrates that when we restrict the sample to only married/cohabitating individuals, we 
find no statistical difference between the races in coverage, consistent with the extensive margin 
findings of Gutter and Hatcher (2008). The different columns illustrate that this coverage result is robust 
to the inclusion or exclusion of sample weights, and to each calendar year. Thus, a major difference in 
                                                          
18 The HRS questions are essentially the same as the SIPP, and the HRS is also widely used for life insurance analysis 
(Bernheim et al. 2003; He, 2009, 2011; Cawley and Philipson, 1999). Differences in life insurance quantities found 
in Bernheim et al. (2003) and Gutter and Hatcher (2008) could be partially explained by confusion about the “cash 
value” and “face value” questions. 
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our extensive margin results comes from analyzing the full sample of individuals rather than restricting 
our analysis to married/cohabitating individuals. When we look at the intensive margin (value of 
policies), we find that the restriction to married/cohabitating individuals causes the coefficient on black 
to change from an insignificant number (see Table 6) to a statistically significant negative coefficient 
from the Tobit analysis. Once again, the restricted sample gives us the same qualitative finding as Gutter 
and Hatcher (2008). 
The second panel of Table 7 shows parallel results from the SCF restricted to 
married/cohabitating households. The first column of results shows that even with the restricted 
married/cohabitating sample we find that blacks are more likely to hold life insurance when we look at 
all years. However, when we isolate our analysis to 2004 SCF – thus using a sample similar to Gutter and 
Hatcher (2008) – we replicate their finding of no difference across race in life insurance coverage. 
However, the remaining columns show the finding is sensitive to sample weights and the particular year 
of analysis. 
Differences between the SIPP and SCF results could be due to differences in sample sizes, level 
of analysis (individual vs. household), or the high proportion of wealthy individuals sampled in the SCF. 
Overall, we are more confident in our findings from the SIPP due to the individual level, insensitivity to 
weights, and the larger sample sizes. 
 
VII. Implications and Concluding Remarks 
Using SIPP data across multiple years, we analyze racial disparities in life insurance coverage. We 
find, contrary to previous literature, that black individuals are more likely to hold life insurance policies. 
Previous studies have excluded single households – which make up more than half of black households – 
and we show that this exclusion matters for the findings. We also analyze the types of insurance held by 
race. Black individuals are more likely to hold whole and employer-sponsored life insurance (ESLI) 
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policies and less likely to hold term life insurance. Whole life insurance is generally considered to be less 
desirable than term life insurance because it mixes a low rate of return investment and high commission 
rates with life insurance coverage (Anagol et al. 2012). ESLI provides conditional coverage which is only 
in force while employed at the given firm. This is problematic for individuals who might leave a job for 
health reasons prior to death. In addition, many individuals are automatically enrolled – but at small 
amounts – in life insurance plans by virtue of being employed at a firm. 
In summary, the evidence points to greater life insurance coverage rates among African-
Americans. Many studies have found significant racial disparities in wealth. A possible reason for this 
racial gap in wealth is differential mortality risk. Mortality differences can contribute to wealth gaps 
through two key mechanisms. First, higher mortality alters the time horizon to enjoy the return from 
investments, including financial, human capital, and health investments. Second, holding investment 
constant, a non-trivial fraction of households will suffer earnings shocks due to the death of a 
breadwinner, which in turn could lead to costly financial choices. With life insurance coverage, this risk 
can be mitigated. Our results on life insurance coverage suggest that mortality differences, at least due 
to the second mechanism, should not contribute to racial wealth gaps. 
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Figure 1 
1a: Mortality Rates by Race 
 
1b: Mortality Rates by Race and Gender 
 
 
Source: http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nvsr/nvsr62/nvsr62_07.pdf 
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Table 1: Summary Statistics - SIPP and SCF  
 2001 2004 2010 
 SIPP SCF SIPP SCF SIPP SCF 
Demographics (Head)       
Age 43.1 42.5 43.5 43.1 44.7 44.2 
Male 0.72 0.76 0.72 0.74 0.71 0.76 
Female 0.28 0.24 0.28 0.26 0.29 0.24 
White 0.86 0.84 0.84 0.83 0.83 0.82 
Black 0.14 0.16 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.18 
Family       
Married 0.54 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.50 0.51 
Child 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.51 0.46 0.49 
Finances       
Employed (Head) 0.85 0.84 0.85 0.81 0.80 0.76 
Net Worth ($1m) 0.16 0.18 0.20 0.15 0.19 0.06 
Owns House 0.60 0.67 0.60 0.68 0.59 0.66 
Household Income ($1k) 4.82 6.43 5.26 6.48 5.56 7.08 
Personal Income ($1k) 3.35 . 3.68 . 3.84 . 
 
Education (Head) 
      
<12th Grade 0.09 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.09 
High School Grad 0.29 0.30 0.23 0.29 0.23 0.3 
Some College 0.32 0.25 0.38 0.26 0.37 0.26 
College Degree 0.30 0.33 0.31 0.36 0.33 0.35 
 
Health (Head) 
      
Good 0.87 0.80 0.87 0.81 0.88 0.78 
Poor 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.19 0.12 0.22 
Smoke . 0.29 . 0.27 . 0.26 
 
Risk Aversion (Investments) 
      
No risk . 0.31 . 0.34 . 0.39 
Average Risk . 0.42 . 0.43 . 0.40 
High Risk . 0.27 . 0.23 . 0.20 
 
Life Insurance (Household) 
      
Any 0.69 0.73 0.65 0.70 0.58 0.66 
Any Term 0.52 0.59 0.50 0.58 0.45 0.55 
Any Whole 0.36 0.28 0.31 0.25 0.26 0.20 
Both Term & Whole 0.15 0.14 0.12 0.13 0.09 0.09 
ESLI 0.48 . 0.44 . 0.39 . 
Individual Life 0.44 . 0.35 . 0.28 . 
Observations 14,079 3,166 21,062 3,163 16,168 4,369 
Notes: Household level data from SIPP 2001, 2004, 2008 (topical and core files) and from the SCF 2001, 2004, 2010 
public files. Household weights are used for both samples. Income is measured on a monthly basis. The sample is 
restricted to household reference persons that are either black or white and between age 18 and 64. 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics - Racial Comparisons 
 2001 2004 2010 
 White Black White Black White Black 
Demographics       
Age 40.7 38.3 41.1 38.7 41.8 39.4 
Male 0.49 0.43 0.49 0.44 0.49 0.45 
Female 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.56 0.51 0.55 
 
Family 
      
Married 0.61 0.37 0.61 0.35 0.57 0.32 
Unmarried Partner 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Separated/Divorced 0.14 0.17 0.14 0.18 0.14 0.16 
Widowed 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.03 
Never Married 0.23 0.43 0.24 0.44 0.27 0.49 
Child 0.54 0.62 0.54 0.60 0.54 0.59 
Child & Married 0.37 0.25 0.37 0.24 0.34 0.21 
Child & Partner 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
Child & Never Married 0.11 0.27 0.12 0.27 0.14 0.29 
Child & Separated/divorced 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 0.05 0.08 
Child & Widow 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 
 
Finances 
      
Employed 0.79 0.69 0.80 0.72 0.75 0.64 
Net Worth ($1 mill.) 0.20 0.05 0.26 0.07 0.25 0.07 
Owns House 0.58 0.31 0.59 0.32 0.56 0.29 
Household Income ($1k) 5.55 3.65 6.20 3.85 6.71 4.09 
Personal Income ($1k) 2.62 1.72 2.90 1.91 3.09 2.02 
 
Education 
      
<12th Grade 0.08 0.19 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.12 
High School Grad 0.30 0.36 0.25 0.30 0.24 0.3 
Some College 0.33 0.31 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.41 
College Degree 0.29 0.13 0.30 0.15 0.33 0.17 
 
Health 
      
Good Health 0.89 0.81 0.90 0.82 0.90 0.85 
Poor Health 0.11 0.19 0.10 0.18 0.10 0.15 
 
Life Insurance 
      
Any 0.57 0.45 0.55 0.45 0.48 0.37 
Any Term 0.40 0.28 0.40 0.28 0.36 0.23 
Any Whole 0.27 0.25 0.23 0.22 0.19 0.18 
Both Term and Whole 0.10 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.07 0.04 
ESLI 0.32 0.25 0.29 0.24 0.25 0.18 
ESLI given Employed 0.40 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.28 
Individual Life 0.42 0.31 0.33 0.28 0.26 0.21 
Face Value of Life Insurance ($1k) 79.2 42.2 . . . . 
Face Value, Given Face Value>0 138.5 89.9 . . . . 
Observations 23,081 3,766 34,865 5,503 26,570 4,594 
Notes: Individual level data from the SIPP topical and core files for the 2001, 2004, and 2008 panels. Income is measured 
on a monthly basis. Individual sample weights were used in computing statistics. The sample is restricted to individuals 
between age 18 and 64. 
 
  
25 
 
Table 3: Life Insurance Coverage – No Controls 
Dependent Variable  Any 
Life Ins. 
 Whole Life 
Ins. 
 Term Life 
Ins. 
 ESLI  Indiv. 
Market 
 
Black  -0.114*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.015*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.125*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.060*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.072*** 
(0.005) 
 
Notes: All specifications use the SIPP. There are 98,379 individual observations for each specification. Dependent 
variable “Indiv. Market” indicates have life insurance holdings through the individual market (not ESLI). The sample 
is restricted to individuals that are either black or white and between age 18 and 64. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and clustered at the household level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table 4: Life Insurance Coverage – With Controls 
Dependent Variable  Any 
Life Ins. 
 Whole Life 
Ins. 
 Term Life 
Ins. 
 ESLI  Indiv. 
Market 
 
Black  0.028*** 
(0.005) 
 0.048*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.011** 
(0.005) 
 0.030*** 
(0.004) 
 0.021*** 
(0.005) 
 
Age 25-39  0.042*** 
(0.007) 
 0.007 
(0.005) 
 0.036*** 
(0.006) 
 0.075*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.011* 
(0.006) 
 
Age 30-34  0.095*** 
(0.007) 
 0.024*** 
(0.006) 
 0.081*** 
(0.007) 
 0.117*** 
(0.006) 
 0.019*** 
(0.006) 
 
Age 35-39  0.136*** 
(0.007) 
 0.044*** 
(0.006) 
 0.110*** 
(0.007) 
 0.126*** 
(0.006) 
 0.053*** 
(0.007) 
 
Age 40-44  0.155*** 
(0.007) 
 0.062*** 
(0.006) 
 0.122*** 
(0.007) 
 0.133*** 
(0.006) 
 0.081*** 
(0.006) 
 
Age 45-49  0.178*** 
(0.007) 
 0.081*** 
(0.006) 
 0.134*** 
(0.007) 
 0.148*** 
(0.006) 
 0.095*** 
(0.006) 
 
Age 50-54  0.197*** 
(0.007) 
 0.099*** 
(0.006) 
 0.131*** 
(0.007) 
 0.141*** 
(0.006) 
 0.119*** 
(0.007) 
 
Age 55-59  0.222*** 
(0.008) 
 0.138*** 
(0.007) 
 0.126*** 
(0.008) 
 0.117*** 
(0.007) 
 0.154*** 
(0.008) 
 
Age 60-64  0.247*** 
(0.009) 
 0.177*** 
(0.008) 
 0.109*** 
(0.008) 
 0.059*** 
(0.007) 
 0.199*** 
(0.008) 
 
<12th Grade  -0.098*** 
(0.006) 
 -0.053*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.066*** 
(0.005) 
 -0.043*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.070*** 
(0.005) 
 
Some College  0.043*** 
(0.004) 
 0.010*** 
(0.004) 
 0.042*** 
(0.004) 
 0.020*** 
(0.003) 
 0.031*** 
(0.004) 
 
College Degree  0.077*** 
(0.005) 
 0.004 
(0.005) 
 0.095*** 
(0.005) 
 0.047*** 
(0.004) 
 0.048*** 
(0.005) 
 
Male  0.015*** 
(0.003) 
 0.017*** 
(0.002) 
 0.014*** 
(0.003) 
 0.016*** 
(0.003) 
 0.020*** 
(0.003) 
 
Married  0.084*** 
(0.004) 
 0.033*** 
(0.004) 
 0.069*** 
(0.004) 
 0.003 
(0.004) 
 0.070*** 
(0.004) 
 
Unmarried Partner  -0.035*** 
(0.009) 
 -0.018*** 
(0.007) 
 -0.016** 
(0.008) 
 -0.008 
(0.008) 
 -0.036*** 
(0.007) 
 
Child  0.028*** 
(0.004) 
 0.016*** 
(0.004) 
 0.022*** 
(0.004) 
 -0.019*** 
(0.003) 
 0.046*** 
(0.004) 
 
Good Health  0.062*** 
(0.005) 
 0.031*** 
(0.005) 
 0.047*** 
(0.005) 
 0.038*** 
(0.004) 
 0.044*** 
(0.005) 
 
Net Worth ($1 m)  -0.004*** 
(0.001) 
 0.001 
(0.002) 
 -0.005*** 
(0.001) 
 -0.007** 
(0.003) 
 0 
(0.002) 
 
Owns House  0.126*** 
(0.006) 
 0.079*** 
(0.005) 
 0.081*** 
(0.005) 
 0.056*** 
(0.005) 
 0.102*** 
(0.005) 
 
Mortgage  0.075*** 
(0.005) 
 0.011** 
(0.004) 
 0.075*** 
(0.005) 
 0.037*** 
(0.004) 
 0.044*** 
(0.005) 
 
Employed  0.158*** 
(0.004) 
 0.053*** 
(0.004) 
 0.129*** 
(0.004) 
 0.245*** 
(0.003) 
 0.014*** 
(0.004) 
 
Personal Income ($1k)  0.018*** 
(0.001) 
 0.007*** 
(0.001) 
 0.017*** 
(0.001) 
 0.023*** 
(0.001) 
 0.009*** 
(0.001) 
 
Notes: All specifications use the SIPP. There are 98,379 individual observations for each specification. Dependent 
variable “Indiv. Market” indicates have life insurance holdings through the individual market (not ESLI). The sample 
is restricted to individuals that are either black or white and between age 18 and 64. Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses and clustered at the household level *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Controls also include year fixed 
effects. 
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Table 5: Gelbach Decomposition of Black/White Gap in Life Insurance Participation 
Explained Contributions of Covariates SIPP 
 Any Life Ins. Whole Life Ins. Term Life Ins. ESLI Indiv. Market 
 Contrib. % of Gap Contrib. % of Gap Contrib. % of Gap Contrib. % of Gap Contrib. % of Gap 
Age 0.010 6.9% 0.006 9.9% 0.005 4.8% 0.004 4.7% 0.007 8.0% 
Education 0.020 13.8% 0.005 8.0% 0.020 17.3% 0.011 11.7% 0.013 13.9% 
Male 0.001 0.7% 0.001 1.8% 0.001 0.8% 0.001 1.1% 0.001 1.4% 
Married 0.021 15.1% 0.009 13.5% 0.018 15.6% 0.001 0.8% 0.018 19.3% 
Unmarried Partner 0.000 -0.1% 0.000 -0.1% 0.000 -0.1% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 -0.1% 
Child -0.002 -1.2% -0.001 -1.5% -0.001 -1.2% 0.001 1.3% -0.003 -3.1% 
Good Health 0.005 3.5% 0.002 3.9% 0.004 3.3% 0.003 3.3% 0.004 3.8% 
Net Worth ($1m) -0.001 -0.5% 0.000 0.2% -0.001 -0.7% -0.001 -1.3% 0.000 0.1% 
Owns House 0.033 23.2% 0.021 32.7% 0.021 18.7% 0.015 16.2% 0.027 28.6% 
Mortgage 0.016 11.5% 0.002 4.0% 0.016 14.3% 0.008 8.8% 0.010 10.3% 
Employed 0.018 12.6% 0.006 9.5% 0.015 12.8% 0.028 30.5% 0.002 1.8% 
Personal Inc. ($1k) 0.019 13.1% 0.008 12.0% 0.018 15.4% 0.024 26.2% 0.009 9.3% 
Year Effects 0.001 0.8% 0.001 1.3% 0.001 0.6% 0.001 0.6% 0.001 1.5% 
Notes: Numbers reported reflect the influence of each covariate in the change of the Black coefficient from the bivariate to the full controls specification. The 
sum of an individual column will fully describe the Black coefficient change from the bivariate case (Table 3) to the specification with full controls (Table 4). 
Each specification includes all variables from Table 4 and has 98,379 observations. 
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Table 6: Face Value of Life Insurance ($1k) 
Black -37.025*** 
(2.378) 
0.723 
(2.092) 
-75.084*** 
(5.333) 
2.718 
(4.387) 
Age 25-39  -3.905 
(3.002) 
 23.319*** 
(6.902) 
Age 30-34  21.892*** 
(4.054) 
 72.061*** 
(7.39) 
Age 35-39  19.657*** 
(3.195) 
 76.185*** 
(6.379) 
Age 40-44  17.673*** 
(3.275) 
 77.382*** 
(6.288) 
Age 45-49  8.831*** 
(3.159) 
 69.879*** 
(6.227) 
Age 50-54  1.633 
(3.382) 
 66.562*** 
(6.557) 
Age 55-59  -1.396 
(3.557) 
 72.517*** 
(6.979) 
Age 60-64  -13.281*** 
(3.504) 
 63.840*** 
(7.403) 
<12th Grade  -7.215*** 
(1.665) 
 -48.126*** 
(4.916) 
Some College  12.074*** 
(1.801) 
 24.167*** 
(3.26) 
College Degree  52.984*** 
(3.211) 
 74.740*** 
(4.542) 
Male  29.330*** 
(1.589) 
 41.017*** 
(2.567) 
Married  28.196*** 
(1.881) 
 48.831*** 
(3.445) 
Unmarried Partner  12.375*** 
(3.518) 
 -1.833 
(7.968) 
Child  24.226*** 
(1.995) 
 30.570*** 
(3.328) 
Good Health  6.612*** 
(1.967) 
 30.684*** 
(4.623) 
Net Worth ($1 mill.)  1.214 
(1.646) 
 0.609 
(1.696) 
Owns House  20.979*** 
(2.415) 
 45.805*** 
(4.393) 
Mortgage  11.568*** 
(2.013) 
 30.592*** 
(3.719) 
Employed  -5.679** 
(2.262) 
 43.359*** 
(4.244) 
Personal Income ($1k)  15.892*** 
(0.805) 
 18.875*** 
(0.93) 
Model OLS OLS Tobit Tobit 
     
Notes: There were 26,847 observations in each regression using the 2001 SIPP panel. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. 
Regressions use individual sample weights and standard errors are clustered at the household level. Controls also include year 
fixed effects. The face value of life insurance is measured in thousands of dollars. 
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Table 7: Reconciling Results with Previous Work - Family Structure, Weighting, Years and Data Sources 
  All Years  2001  2004  2010  
SIPP              
Any Life Insurance  0.002 
(0.008) 
0.006 
(0.008) 
 -0.005 
(0.015) 
0.001 
(0.014) 
 0.006 
(0.014) 
0.014 
(0.012) 
 0.007 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
 
              
Face Value ($1k)  -12.13* 
(6.61) 
-10.84* 
(5.95) 
 -12.13* 
(6.61) 
-10.84* 
(5.95) 
 . .  . .  
SCF              
Any Life Insurance  0.053*** 
(0.015) 
0.044*** 
(0.013) 
 0.079** 
(0.031) 
0.052 
(0.032) 
 0.033 
(0.038) 
0.022 
(0.032) 
 0.061** 
(0.029) 
0.062** 
(0.026) 
 
              
Face Value ($1k)  -12.62 
(37.72) 
-75.27 
(242.54) 
 43.93 
(44.82) 
18.74 
(346.09) 
 -65.03 
(91.47) 
-183.64 
(511.10) 
 -36.01 
(76.01) 
-24.69 
(569.69) 
 
Weights Included?  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  Yes No  
SIPP Sample Size  61,557 61,557  17,207 17,207  25,542 25,542  18,808 18,808  
SCF Sample Size  11,535 11,535  2,169 2,169  2,088 2,088  2,777 2,777  
Notes: Coefficients for Black reported where *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10. Linear Probability Model used to estimate 
specifications with Any Life Insurance as the dependent variable and Tobit regressions for specifications with Face Value as the 
dependent variable. All years of SCF includes 2001, 2004, 2007, 2010 and 2013. In addition to the covariates from Table 4, 
variables for smoking status, bequest motives and risk aversion included for SCF regressions. 
 
